These three propositions specks up contradictions, as if two are true then the other one is false. So, God does not exist. Therefore he never allows us to go through anything that does not have the possibility of helping us get to heaven. My second concern with the free will excuse arises from the fact that in order to even entertain it, you have to first take what is known in philosophy as an incompatibilist view of free will. Unless I am mistaken, the Hindus speak of creation as a kind of dance. And this is just one example, but it is enough to show that an evil that exists in the present can have good effects hundreds or thousands of years from now that we are unable to fathom or predict.
They are objectively two different forms. I suggest that wherever he draws the line, it will be an arbitrary line. God created everything other than himself. At least one instance of seemingly gratuitous evil in the course of sentient history is, in fact, gratuitous. The paradoxically also recognises that agents should be judged by the result of their actions. Why, if this argument would be unacceptable coming from a human being, should we think it any more acceptable coming from God? The problem with this approach, however, is that it concludes that there are no good reasons for these evils just because those reasons are not immediately apparent to us.
That theistic explanation has two strikes against it in that we cannot understand how an immaterial being can act on the material world, and it posits the existence of hidden reasons, those beyond our ken. We must have some sort of good reason to believe something is actually true. We couldn't say that this most basic part doesn't have a form. But obviously, this is not the case. Certainly yes, but not a three.
Moreover, if we treat theism as a hypothesis rather than as a fact , theism might be subject to prima facie defeat by facts about suffering and misery, but nevertheless explain or predict a whole range of other data better than naturalism, such as our possession of reliable cognitive faculties, the existence of objective morality, the fine-tuning of the universe, the existence of abstract objects, and so on. The Jews were grappling with the problem of evil long before the birth of Christianity, as were other pre-Christian religions. At some point the first persons walked the earth, and through them sin entered the world. If God has all the attributes he is said to have, then one would be tempted to say that there would be no evil in the world. . If you find any joy or stimulation at , please consider becoming a Supporting Member with a recurring monthly donation of your choosing, between a cup of tea and a good dinner.
First, why suppose it is reasonable to believe that there is no greater good that wold require God permit so much horrible suffering in the world? He juggles for the delight of it, but he is at every moment free to stop, even if he knows from the very beginning precisely what he will do and for how long. To answer this question, one necessarily needs to go outside the physical cosmos itself. You can dismiss the support request pop up for 4 weeks 28 days if you want to be reminded again. Notwithstanding a quotation from the Catechism, you do not allow your account of suffering - which needs to be rational and philosophic - to be illuminated by various longstanding wisdom traditions. Once the ball melts, we don't say that the previously existing ball was an illusion.
In fact, the truth of the matter is. This is so hard for us to understand with natural reason because we live in a state where we feel the effects of original sin every day. Ask yourself the following question: Is it possible for God to create a state of affairs in which beings have free will and yet never choose to do that which is wrong? What seems like the correction of a mistake to us was always there, existing at the artist's whim and pleasure. If the ball could not have potentially become a puddle of melted rubber before it was actually a puddle of melted rubber, then it could not have become a puddle of melted rubber in actual reality. But to be able to see these as beneficial requires some belief in purgatory, prayer, the communion of saints, and of course the beatific vision. Smith discusses two ways to prove atheism: scientific cosmology and gratuitous evil.
Furthermore, if those answers were attainable through prayer, apologists would be offering them already. As Drange points out, his argument by itself, disregarding the support for its premises, is a deductive or logical argument from evil. So if there is any evil that could happen to us out of which a good can't be brought out of it seems it would be because of our personal inability to freely respond to God's grace, not because of God's lack of power. The most widely known and cited is the Epicurean paradox: Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? So if I took these and placed them in a pile I would not have the essence. In this chapter, Draper defends his views on plausibility and then argues that Plantinga's challenge to the significance of his final conclusion fails for two reasons. That's why the weaker form of the argument from evil was proffered in the first place.
Consider the cases already sketched. The problem, as we saw previously, is that if the god described in 1 really existed, then it would seemingly a. If we take cancer by itself we can't call it bad. I challenge anyone who maintains that there is not gratuitous or unbearable suffering in the world to argue for, and steadfastly maintain, that position while being waterboarded. Still, I think the point stands, regardless. Think of a child afflicted with leukemia; though the child may suffer greatly for the last few years or months of his or her life, when they awake from their death they will find themselves in heavenly bliss and will remain that way for all eternity…or so the argument goes. Persons include God, Angels, and humans, though I cannot know if this list is exhaustive.
So the unicorn doesn't have to exist in reality for us to be able to contemplate the essence, the nature, of what a unicorn is. I recently saw a nature documentary about Pacific salmon. Though a lay exposition geared at a general audience, the essay appeals to a variety of atheistic arguments, including the argument from religious confusion, an evidential argument from evil, divine hiddenness, the argument from biological evolution, and the argument from physical minds. But whatever language we use, we are really speaking of his ultimate, unabrogated freedom. I grant it may be possible.
Aquinas doesn't accept the nature of God as a brute fact, that would be closer to an ontological argument for God which may start with some definition of God. But an infinite regress is not a logical contradiction. Only persons are capable of evil, since only persons have free will. In any event, we are not in a position to defend either on a standard of absolute certainty. Not to mention that for many people these disasters are not only hurt but are permanently damaging causing mental disorders and more suffering.